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THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF LAW
Norman Barry t
That there is a "crisis" in law is not denied by contemporary
classical liberals (or neo-conservatives). The rise of statute and public law in the twentieth century and the decline of common law and
private law has been commented on frequently by, to name just a
few individualists, Leoni, Hayek, Mises, and the market economists.
Furthermore, the rise of "sovereign" legislatures and the effects of
majority-rule democracy have combined to turn law into a means for
producing social "end-states" rather than general rules to guide individuals in the pursuit of their chosen purposes. Further, assiduous
though legislatures and courts in western democracies have been in
protecting civil liberties (although even this is less true of the United
Kingdom than the United States), they have been active in the destruction of economic liberty, thus denying that symmetry between
personal and economic freedom that is at the foundation of classical
liberal social philosophy.
Law is intimately connected with freedom in classical law, not
just in the trivial sense that a free society is a rule-governed order
which diminishes the coercive power that political authorities have
over individuals, but also in the theoretical sense that an explanation of liberty can be given which makes freedom and law consistent. Thus here the objection is to Bentham's observation that
"[e]very law is an infraction of liberty."' For this implies that each
freedom reducing act of law has to be justified on utilitarian or pragmatic grounds, opening up the possibilities of endless interventions
with free actions on the ground that they advance some alleged collective good.
In the classical liberal theory of law, however, legal rules only
vitiate liberty when the individual is directed to perform some action
(as in the phenomena of taxation, conscription, and the direction of
labor in a command economy). Most legal rules in classical law are
prohibitions, forbidding certain courses of action, or authoritative
procedures telling an individual how to do certain things (in Michael
Oakeshott's phrase, proper law consists of "adverbial rules" 2). The
t
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classical liberal maintains that free societies have been undermined
precisely because the ambit of public law (involving the direction of
people to specific purposes) has widened vastly, to the diminution of
the range of private law. Of course, there are very serious difficulties for the classical lawyer in the question of the content of laws as
prohibitions and authoritative procedures, and of the proper limits
of public law since (with some exotic exceptions) most individualist
jurists accept the necessity for a public realm. Nevertheless, the distinction between public and private is germane to the classical theory of law.
What is the foundation for the classical theory of law as a general system of rules for the guidance of individuals? The first thing
to note is that classical law occupies a kind of midway position between what is conventionally known as natural law and positive law.
The general anti-rationalist philosophical stance that most classical
lawyers take means that they would deny that the human reason is
capable of discerning an objective set of moral norms that can be
used to validate all claims to law. A proper legal system is identified
with traditional rules of conduct which have developed in response
to human needs and circumstances, and these rules cannot be derived by the use of an unaided reason. However, classical lawyers
cannot accept as "good" any rule or ukase merely because it emanates from a legislature or is consistent with a "rule of recognition"
(in the sense defined by H.L.A. Hart). Thus there can be standards
of evaluation that derive from the notion of "law" itself rather than
from some alleged objective morality. Furthermore, the classical
lawyers' objections to some legislative enactments (and, indeed,
court decisions) that are contrary to those natural regularities that
economic science reveals show that there is a close connection between classical law and "natural" laws of economy and society.
Thus, although many laws, regulations, and judicial decisions may
be "legitimate" in a formal or positivist sense, their incongruence
with what we know of social processes renders their claim to be law
in the broad sense dubious: at the very least they will produce less
complex orders.
The main feature of classical law that distinguishes it from almost all forms of positivism is its denial of the assumption that law
requires an "author," some authoritative source that creates a legal
order. Positivists in the English tradition of jurisprudence identify
authorship with a sovereign while American Realists locate law creation in judicial activity itself, but both are at one in denying that
rules to guide conduct can exist independently of the human will.
But as Hayek and others have argued, this is an error, for a whole
tradition of western legality shows that coherent and predictable
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legal orders can develop independently of will, design, and intention. Of course, the common law is the paradigm case of this phenomenon and it is the acceptance of its rules as appropriate guides to
conduct that constitutes their legality. As A.W.B. Simpson says:
"Common Law rules enjoy whatever status they possess not because
of the circumstances of their origin, but because of their continued
reception." 3 Thus it is that the principles of the English law of contract have developed entirely without the aid of a single statute.
The attraction of the common law system to liberal individualists should be obvious: it has developed through individuals settling
their disputes by reference to its rules, rules that exist independently of will and which themselves embody, contrary to positivism,
non-articulated moral notions. To quote Simpson again: "In the
Common Law system no very clear distinction exists between saying
that a particular solution to a problem is in accordance with the law,
4
and saying that it is the rational, fair or just solution."
It is of course true that a liberal individualist order can be conceived of in terms of written enactments, bills of rights, the Rechsstaat, constitutions, and so on. Indeed, Hayek in The Constitution of
Liberty 5 seems to be indifferent between the common law and some
fixed code as the most efficient guarantor of a free and predictable
legal order. However, in Rules and Order 6 the emphasis is almost entirely on the virtues of spontaneous or unplanned legal orders because of an important philosophical reason concerning the nature of
human knowledge. This reason is that the human mind (in this context, the legislative "mind") is constitutionally incapable of constructing a code of rules appropriate for all human circumstances.
The complexity of an advanced society means that all legal rules
must be necessarily abstract, in contrast, say, to the rules of a primitive society. Many of the rules of an advanced society are not articulated fully in a code yet have a cognitive significance in the rational
description of a legal order, and most knowledge in a legal order is
"tacit" knowledge.
Hence legal reasoning cannot be mechanistic or deductive, applying fully-articulated principles to particular cases. Hayek, and
others in the classical tradition, liken judicial activity to "puzzlesolving" in which a judge tries to find an appropriate rule to fit a
particular case. It is not the function of the judge to bring about
some desirable state of affairs but to find objectively the right deci3
Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
85-86 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 2d ser. 1973).
4
Id. at 79.
5 F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY ch. 13 (1960).
6
F.A. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER ch. 4 (1973).
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sion within the general system of rules, a system that exists independently of judicial activity itself.
What is important in the classical theory of law is a distinction
between "law" and "legislation." Law deals with the actions of private agents and has no purpose beyond providing a predictable
framework for individuals to pursue their private ends with the minimum of collision with each other. It might be thought, however,
that this predictability is compromised by the fact that the development of law is a matter of judicial decision-making which is essentially subjective and unpredictable. But this is to make too much of
"hard" or difficult cases, cases for which no articulated rule seems
appropriate. In fact, the bulk of social life is conducted in accordance with rules that are not in dispute. The relevant contrast ought
to be between the unpredictability of judicial decision-making and
the unpredictability of a complete Benthamite statutory systemwhich is a function very largely of the caprice of legislators.
Yet classical jurisprudence does not exclude "legislation" or
public law, that is, law with a specific purpose. The common law is
entirely appropriate for a market society: to enable individuals to
exchange for their mutual benefit with reasonable security. But
those very same individuals will not generate all that is socially desirable by their mutual exchanges: some public purposes (or public
goods) require a framework of legislation or "made" law. Thus,
although the usefulness of the common law in the application of
new rules to handle "externality" problems without the need for
legislative intervention has often been under-estimated, it is undoubtedly the case that in the classical theory of law the rationale for
legislation lay in the vexed question of market failure. The major
problem in classical jurisprudence has been the restriction of legislation to those areas of social and economic life which have a genuine public dimension. The relative demise of classical law has come
about through the intrusion of public law or legislation into what is
essentially the private domain: the continued interference with contracts, the close regulation of economic life on behalf of an alleged
"public interest," and the taking of property and the construction of
welfare schemes on the a priori assumption that private arrangements could not generate such desirable states of affairs.
If the common law or classical law is interpreted as a more or
less self-consistent (although necessarily untidy) body of rules, articulated and non-articulated, it has a validity in a natural law sense
independent of a constitution, a rule of recognition, a Kelsenian
Grundnorm, or a sovereign's command. The validity of particular
rules will be a function of their consistency with the Whole system
and their conformity to certain more or less universally true princi-
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ples of human nature first adumbrated by David Hume and Adam
Smith. These principles include the recognition of (a not necessarily harmful) self-interest, scarcity (therefore the need for property
rules), the propensity to value the present higher than the future
(time-preference), and so on.
The most decisive contrast between classical law and modem
positive law is in the question ofjustice. Justice in classical law is the
impartial application of universal rules, rules that do not discriminate and which privilege no persons or groups. The point about
classical law is that it is "neutral" with regard to the various outcomes that emerge from a rule-governed process; legality is doing
justice to individuals and not about the generating of a particular
state of affairs. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out in passing
that in an indirect utilitarian sense this limited concept ofjustice has
been instrumental in (unintentionally) generating highly complex
social orders. Modem positive law, however, looks to legislation to
create desirable end-states, justified under the general rubric of
"social justice." These range from straightforward income redistribution through to the creation of "equal" opportunities for named
groups, groups that are in no way discriminated by the law itself.
Irrespective of the counter-productive nature (in a utilitarian sense)
of these measures, they are condemnable from a classical law point
of view because of the damage they do to legality.
Why has classical law broken down? The question is of course
unanswerable in any uncontroversial sense. Nevertheless, we can
point to certain movements of opinion, historical developments,
and institutional arrangements which have summed to produce an
intellectual and political atmosphere in almost all western democracies which is unfavorable to the traditional notion of liberty under
the law.
From the point of view ofjurisprudence, particularly damaging
was the tendency to validate law by some external criterion, such as
a constitution. This may sound odd, but in classical law a constitution was a kind of super structure, a body of rules for the organization of government itself: in other words, law had a self-generated
permanence and stability and persisted through, possibly, transient
political arrangements. The trouble was that this necessary distinction between law and politics depended upon a tacit acceptance by
political rulers that there was, indeed, such a distinction. The problem has been particularly acute in Britain whose unwritten constitution has in the twentieth century permitted the erosion of law by
politics. Although not since the seventeenth century has anyone
dared to suggest that the common law is the embodiment of "right
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reason" and thence superior to statute, nevertheless for a very long
time legislative reticence was preserved. This is no longer so.
The issue here is the sovereignty of parliament, and the organization of that institution, under modern democratic conditions, on
party lines. For common law is always vulnerable to statute once it
becomes accepted that legal validity is a function of the decisions of
a representative body. In the pre-legislative era of classical law it
might have been true to say, as Hayek does repeatedly, that the
common law principle which holds that a person is permitted to do
whatever is not forbidden by law did embody more "rights" than
those that could be enumerated in some "positive" declaration, but
that claim sounds hollow in late twentieth-century Britain. Yet, curiously enough, and to the chagrin of spontaneous order theorists,
the principle that ultimate legal validity is a function of parliamentary sovereignty was not planned, designed, or even thought of by
anybody: it just happened. Indeed it is a principle of the common
law. It could even be said that it is so because it was said to be so in
a famous textbook on constitutional law written by Dicey. 7 There
are, nevertheless, a few English constitutional lawyers who say,
along with George and Ira Gershwin, that "it ain't necessarily so."
Their day may yet come, especially with the impact of EEC law and
international human rights law on the United Kingdom. 8
Americans have been more fortunate than the British since
from the very beginning they have had all the paraphernalia ofproper
constitutionalism: federalism, the separation of powers, judicial review, and so on. These were designed, especially judicial review,
presumably, to protect classical law and the traditional rights that it
embodies from the intrusion of legislation. This is in contrast to the
British tradition which precludes the courts from adjudicating on
the substance of a statute; there judicial review is limited to ministerial or other action under a necessarily legitimate law. Thus,
although American law is consistent with positive law jurisprudence
in that the validity of purported claims to law is established by "testing" them against some other rule, in contrast to Hayekian quasinatural law procedures (which embody the universability criterion),
there is no substantive difference between traditional American constitutionalism and classical law since the protections for individuality
contained in the document can be interpreted as declarations of
general common law principles. These are the kind of protections
British classical lawyers, in the face of the erosion of the common
7

A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION

(10th ed. 1964).
8 See Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament-inPerpetuity, in THE CHANGING CONSTI-

TUTioN 23-47 (J. Jowell & D. Oliver eds. 1985).
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law in the United Kingdom, are beginning to wish obtained in their
country.
The fact that such classical law protections for individuality no
longer hold in the United States in the economic sphere is now a
matter of great concern to individualist economists and lawyers.
Since 1937 a supine Supreme Court has permitted a massive rise of
public law, of economic regulation and the promotion of state welfare, most of which flies in the face of those standards of legality
proclaimed by classical law. 9 All of this legislation goes beyond the
provision of public goods via public law that is permitted by classical
law, and all of it is written in defiance of well-established truths of
economic theory. From the point of view of classical law jurisprudence the Supreme Court is now in the curious position of refusing
to enforce "agreed-on" limitations on the legislature, while at the
same time "creating" law (for example, in the areas of enforced integration and affirmative action) in a manner quite inconsistent with
the traditional ideal of judicial activity.
Why all this should have occurred is not my concern here.
However, certain developments in twentieth century American
thought created an atmosphere in which such departures from the
classical ideal of law could become intellectually respectable. In jurisprudence America's major contribution to positivism, realist legal
theory, has some quite damaging implications for classical law.
For realism does presuppose that law must have an author.
Since America has never had a sovereign legislature, and since the
whole idea of judicial review necessitates that the courts play a crucial role in the determination of the content of law, it was almost
inevitable that the judges should be seen as the authors of law.
Hence the familiar expressions: "law is what the courts say it is"
and "rules are only sources of law." The realist movement made all
of its intellectual profit from the fact of its alertness to the simple
truth that a mechanical jurisprudence is impossible. Because human
language is necessarily imprecise (in Hart's memorable word,
"open-textured") there can be no uncontroversial application of
rules to particular cases; and this means that judges must have considerable discretion. The way that this is exercised will obviously
have great significance for the development of law and society.
Again, it was almost inevitable, given the nature of the "judicial decision," that attention should be directed towards all those sociological factors that were said to determine that decision. Thus there was
a dramatic shift from a jurisprudence concerned with the meaning of
rules to one in which rules have no objective existence at all. Fur9
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thermore, if judges are the real "authors" of law, then why should
they not create a legal order which reflects social conditions and
meets social demands? If there are no binding rules to guide conduct then the argument that social policy should replace law becomes almost irresistible.
The implications of this for classical law are serious. For the
whole tradition of common law presupposes that an objective body
of rules does exist (even though much of it may be incapable of precise articulation). If there were no independent and objective laws,
a rule-governed society would be impossible. Although the law will
develop spontaneously through interpretation of rules and the adjudication of difficult cases, classical law does not suppose that a judicial decision is therefore completely subjective, a disguised
expression of class interest, or is determined by what the judges had
for breakfast. The absence of a mechanical jurisprudence does not
imply that discretion is entirely unfettered and that individuals cannot be guided by general rules, or judges bound by them, so that
attention should be directed towards the prediction of court behavior on the basis of some extra-legal criteria. For this, to follow
Hart's illuminating terminology, is to understand law entirely from
the "external" point of view and leads to the elimination of those
"internal" features of legality, for example, the obligatory nature of
rules as constituting normative standards, which make a predictable
legal order possible.1 0
In classical law, there is a specific role for the judiciary that depends upon their specialized knowledge. To quote Simpson yet
again, law is "a body of practices observed and ideas received by a
caste of lawyers." 1 In difficult cases, then, the criteria for adjudication should always be legal criteria rather than political criteria. The
contemporary crisis in legal theory has come about largely through
the erroneous belief that the courts have no other standards than
those set by current social forces and transient coalitions of groups.
From this perspective, the dramatic shifts of opinion that have
occurred in the Supreme Court, shifts that have done so much to
lend credence to the realists' case, may not so much validate the
claims of sociological determinism but simply illustrate the influence of erroneous ideas. I will mention briefly two: the idea that
freedom is divisible and that "freedoms" can be hierarchically ordered; and the notion that legislatures, because they are democratically elected, require no further legal constraint (in America, the
latter point applies only to economic legislation, the authors of
10
I1
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which might just as well be called "sovereigns" despite all the apparatus of constitutionalism).
The role that classical law gives to the judiciary in a complex
society must be that of enforcing general standards of legality even
against the "democratic will" (as embodied in public law). The rationale for this is that in a complex society, characterized by competing and divergent ends and purposes, there is no such thing as a
democratic will which is not also the imposition of some particular
end-state or purpose on society at large. Even if there were a genuine majority will, as opposed to the coalition of interests that is a
surrogate for the majority in all democratic societies, there is no reason why that should be decisive (least of all in America). Classical
law presupposes only that there is a minimum of agreement on rules
and practices. This requires judicial "creativity" only in the enforcement of such standards in difficult cases and in their protection
against transient majorities in legislatures.
The restoration of the classical idea of law is a difficult task. As
Hayek has often pointed out, the legal profession no longer resembles very closely Simpson's "caste" of experts, adept at puzzle-solving and the exploration of the meanings of rules. One legacy of
realism is that lawyers have become obsessively concerned with the
"social" aspects of law: less concerned with the adjudication of cases
and more with the implementation of what they believe to be socially acceptable values. Again, as many individualists have pointed
out, in economic judgments they have revealed themselves to be in
the grip of erroneous doctrines.
Classical legal philosophers differ in their recommendations as
to how an individualist legal order might be created and the rise of
public law checked. There are two possibilities. First, that the
courts might reassert the traditional role of review of economic legislation or that some reduction on the power of legislatures be instituted (perhaps a modification of the simply majority rule).
Undoubtedly it is the "unreliability" of the courts that has led many
individualists, from Hayek to Buchanan,1 2 to demand more comprehensive constitutional rearrangements. Such constitutional rearrangements that have been proposed do not involve the creation of
new law but rather the resurrection of traditional rules. They also
recommend institutional forms which transmit genuine "opinion"
more accurately than does conventional majority rule democracy.
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